Just as the Joker is to Batman, the CSTO is to NATO. Russia’s collective defence alliance, the CSTO, comprises many central Asian post-Soviet states. Over the past half-decade, Kazakhstan, a critical CSTO member state, has made unfriendly diplomatic movements towards Russia.
Kazakh distancing from Russia has been slow. Still, small changes like the reaffirmed transition from Cyrillic to Latin script in the Kazakh language indicate defiance of the seemingly inextricable chains of the two nations and their participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. March 2022 delivered a significant blow to Russia when Kazakhstan abstained from the UN Ukraine Invasion resolution – surely, one of Russia’s most vital allies would stand up for them and vote against? And in November 2023, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev delivered what was meant to be a somewhat unremarkable speech, reaffirming close ties. Yet, it was not what he said that was so remarkable. President Tokayev delivered the speech entirely in Kazakh rather than the expected Russian, so the Russian delegation was naturally left fumbling for their headsets. Some consider President Tokayev’s response to President Putin’s lack of etiquette as he (perhaps deliberately) repeatedly used incorrect versions of President Tokayev’s patronymic name. Still, these small acts send a bigger message to the Kremlin.
That being said, in January 2022, the Kazakhstani government called upon the CSTO to help quash protests, and the CSTO sent 2,500 soldiers (mostly Russian). Now, this doesn’t sound like a sour relationship teetering on collapse. I’m not entirely wrong; the Kazakhstani citizens, as a Demoscope survey found, have worse opinions of Russia since the war. And this is especially the case with younger citizens, as only 0.7% sympathise with Russia. So, to some extent, there is a different stance within the general population compared to the government – but in Kazakhstan, as in many nations, that’s hardly new.
So why is Kazakhstan still tied up with Russia? Three principles could explain this: political persuasion, economic interdependence, and social and cultural integration.
For the same reason that Ukraine delayed signing the EU trade and cooperation agreement in 2013 because Russia had asked them not to, I am sure a similar threat could make its way south from Moscow to Astana. It doesn’t require much imagination to understand why Kazakhstan is reticent to align too closely with NATO. And besides, it can’t all be bad for Kazakhstani officials; there is something to be said for staying friends with one’s neighbours, especially when those neighbours have RS-28 Sarmat ICBMs.
Ask one economist, and they’ll tell you that Kazakhstan doesn’t benefit from the EAEU (Eurasian Economic Union: the CSTO’s trade union). Then, ask another, and they’ll say that Kazakhstan couldn’t be without the EAEU, especially as just shy of 30% of Kazakhstan’s imports are from Russia. Free trade and standardised policies/standards improve trade. However, when one member state consumes 80% of external EAEU duties and 90% of EAEU member state exports, the benefit to Kazakhstan from the EAEU seems tenuous.
I have always believed that free trade can facilitate economic growth and improve prospects. But the direct line from the Kremlin into Astana’s pocket feels more exploitative and less mutually beneficial. In this case, free trade appears to be a guise for becoming or being a ‘client state’.
However, economics is not the only factor driving Kazakhstan’s continued integration with Russia. Although 70% of the population may be Kazakh, the second-biggest ethnicity is Russian, with 1 in 6 being Ethnic Russians. Not forgetting that for 55 years, Kazakhstan was a part of the Soviet Union – there are so many Russian imprints on life in Kazakhstan. Is it right to reject such a huge cultural influence when it’s a part of you? And would this demonise those Ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan? It’s a many-faceted argument that’s deeply personal to every Kazakhstani – Kazakh, ethnically Russian or otherwise.
It’s not wrong to have hoped that Kazakhstan would have freed itself from Russia. But with Ukraine under attack, the picture of angry Russian soldiers marching over the border must feature largely in Kazakh officials’ nightmares. Why would Kazakhstan try to leave if staying provides economic, political and physical security? We could attribute the past three years of diplomatic movements to some incoherence in the government’s messaging. After all, with so many interests at play, there is sure to be some internal friction. Maybe my hopes for Kazakhstan were misplaced; maybe my analysis of the movements was wrong. But maybe, one day, I will be right about Kazakhstan.
